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Abstract: Offshore tax havens have recently become the target of interna-
tional criticism and reform efforts due to their role in eroding foreign tax 
bases through competitive tax practices. William Brittain-Catlin’s book, 
Offshore: The Dark Side of the Global Economy, discusses how offshore tax laws 
have been exploited and explains measures taken by international groups, 
such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), to counteract harmful tax competition. This Book Review cri-
tiques the efforts of the OECD to mitigate offshore tax havens’ contribu-
tion to harmful tax competition by expanding on two of Brittain-Catlin’s 
conclusions. In doing so, the Book Review will demonstrate that the 
OECD’s actions have not only caused severe economic harm to numerous 
developing nation economies, but they have failed to elicit sufªcient sup-
port to successfully curb harmful tax competition. 
Introduction 
 Offshore tax havens and ªnancial centers, many of which are lo-
cated within small, economically developing island nations,1 have long 
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2005–2006). 
1 The term “offshore” tax haven refers to “foreign jurisdictions where the legislative, 
regulatory, and tax framework is less restrictive compared to an investor’s home-base.” G. 
Scott Dowling, Comment, Fatal Broadside: The Demise of Caribbean Offshore Financial 
Conªdentiality Post USA PATRIOT Act, 17 Transnat’l Law 259, 263 (2004). An offshore 
ªnancial center is essentially a tax haven that is “principally involved in the ªnancial services 
sector and in [foreign portfolio investment].” William B. Barker, Optimal International Taxa-
tion and Tax Competition: Overcoming the Contradictions, 22 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 161, 177 
(2002). Many offshore tax havens are island nations in the Caribbean and Paciªc with fewer 
than 200,000 residents. See id. at 177; Vaughn E. James, Twenty-First Century Pirates of the Carib-
bean: How the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Robbed Fourteen CARICOM 
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been recognized for providing highly favorable ªnancial advantages to 
foreign corporations and individuals.2 These offshore havens, how-
ever, have recently become the center of intense international criti-
cism given their role in eroding foreign tax revenues by offering 
markedly low tax rates3 and facilitating domestic tax evasion and 
money laundering through strict ªnancial secrecy laws.4 In his book, 
Offshore: The Dark Side of the Global Economy, William Brittain-Catlin 
provides a detailed explanation of the speciªc abuses of the tax advan-
tages within one of the world’s most used offshore havens, the Cay-
man Islands.5 In particular, Brittain-Catlin describes how multina-
tional companies have been lured to incorporate subsidiaries within 
the Cayman Islands to take advantage of its strict ªnancial secrecy laws 
                                                                                                                      
Countries of Their Tax and Economic Policy Sovereignty, 34 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 1, 4 
(2002). Given their size, along with several other factors, the majority of these nations are 
considered “have-not countries that rely on ªnancial services to provide them with much 
needed employment and tax revenues . . . .” Matt Blackman, Still in the Line of Fire, Gold-
haven Info. Sys. (1999), http://www.goldhaven.com/LineofFire.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006). 
2 See Milton Grundy, Grundy’s Tax Havens: Offshore Business Centres: A 
World Survey, at v (6th ed. 1993) (noting that as of 1969, 14 jurisdictions existed where 
one could form a zero-tax entity). The Cayman Islands inception as an offshore ªnancial 
center began in the 1960s when its business community took advantage of the Eurodollar 
market to avoid tight U.S. restrictions on the export of the dollar. William Brittain-
Catlin, Offshore: The Dark Side of the Global Economy 8 (2005). 
3 In May 1996, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) was prompted by ªnancial ministers to counter harmful tax competition and its 
negative effects on national tax bases. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Harmful 
Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue 3 (1998) [hereinafter Emerging Global 
Issue]. In its 1998 report, the OECD indicated that one of the criteria to be considered a 
tax haven is to have no or nominal tax rates. Id. at 23; see also Alexander Townsend, Jr., 
Comment, The Global Schoolyard Bully: The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment’s Coercive Efforts to Control Tax Competition, 25 Fordham Int’l L.J. 215, 234 (2001) 
(noting that the British public interest group Oxfam International estimated the amount 
of lost revenue by industrialized nations due to tax havens at $50 billion annually). 
4 See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the 
Welfare State, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1573, 1576 (2000) (explaining how strict banking secrecy 
laws of tax havens have hindered countries from collecting tax revenue on the foreign-
sourced income); Kathleen A. Lacey & Barbara Crutchªeld George, Crackdown on Money 
Laundering: A Comparative Analysis of the Feasibility and Effectiveness of Domestic and Multilateral 
Policy Reforms, 23 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 263, 277 (2003) (discussing how offshore havens’ 
ªnancial secrecy laws have facilitated money laundering); Dowling, supra note 1, at 271 
(explaining how the strict ªnancial conªdentiality laws of offshore tax havens are often 
misused by criminal enterprises to hamper legitimate law enforcement measures). 
5 See generally Brittain-Catlin, supra note 2. Brittain-Catlin notes that by harboring 
offshore ªnancial centers, the Cayman Islands became the ªfth-largest banking center in 
the world. See id. at 8; see also Taylor Morgan Hoffman, The Future of Offshore Tax Havens, 2 
Chi. J. Int’l L. 511, 513 (2001) (indicating that only New York, London, Tokyo, and Hong 
Kong have larger capital markets than the Cayman Islands). 
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and non-imposition of taxes, effectively allowing these corporations to 
avoid paying domestic taxes on millions of dollars in annual income.6 
In addition, he illustrates how the Cayman Islands’ secrecy laws have 
allowed corporations to hide debt in various offshore ªnancial in-
struments to deceive investors with over-inºated ªnancial statements.7 
In doing so, Brittain-Catlin acknowledges how this deceptive practice 
contributed greatly to the economic collapses of Venezuela, Argen-
tina, Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Russia during the 1990s.8 Fur-
thermore, Brittain-Catlin discusses the use of offshore ªnancial se-
crecy laws as a medium for criminal activities, which has been a 
growing concern given the role such hidden money has played in 
funding international terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda.9
 Brittain-Catlin’s book also illustrates how numerous countries and 
international organizations have taken up arms to protect their tax 
bases from harmful tax competition and their mainlands from illegal 
activity and terrorist threats through various unilateral and multilat-
eral measures.10 One notable effort he details was that initiated by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
an international advocacy group for economic policy comprised of the 
world’s wealthiest and most politically inºuential nations.11 Alarmed 
                                                                                                                      
6 Brittain-Catlin, supra note 2, at 55, 91–92. By establishing over seven hundred sub-
sidiaries in Caribbean tax havens, Enron paid U.S. corporate federal income tax only once 
in a ªve-year period. Id. at 55. Despite having proªts near $2 billion, Enron’s tax liabilities 
totaled just $17 million. Id. Similarly, the Stanley Works tool company estimated a reduc-
tion from 32% to 24% in domestic taxes, a savings of $30 million annually, by reincorpo-
rating in Bermuda. Id. at 91–92. 
7 See id. at 72–73 (explaining how Enron used the Cayman Islands’ Limited Partner-
ship setup option to hide $618 million of investment losses offshore, thus allowing it to 
overstate earnings to investors by $586 million). 
8 See id. at 188. The International Monetary Fund has indicated that various domestic 
and foreign business ventures within South American and Asian countries similarly hid 
billions of dollars of losses in offshore ªnancial centers, catalyzing their economic melt-
downs. Id. 
9 Id. at 207–13 (describing the vast global ªnances of Osama Bin Laden and the 
difªculty of ascertaining their whereabouts given suspected holdings in onshore and off-
shore accounts shielded by strict secrecy laws). 
10 See id. at 195, 204–06. In 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) produced a 
list of ªfteen nations without sufªcient money laundering controls. Id. at 195. The OECD 
created a similar list in 2000 identifying tax havens engaging in harmful tax practices. Id. 
Brittain-Catlin also describes the European Union savings tax directive, which sought to 
coerce the Cayman Islands, a dependent territory of Britain, to engage in open exchange 
of banking information with its other members. Id. at 219. 
11 The OECD was established in 1960 for the stated intentions of: 1) achieving sustain-
able economic growth in member countries, while contributing to the ªnancial stability of 
the world economy, 2) continually expanding the economies of member countries and to 
develop those of non-member countries, and 3) contributing to the expansion of world trade 
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by the international community’s loss of revenue due to the prevalent 
use of offshore tax havens, the OECD has focused its efforts to mini-
mize the effects of “harmful tax competition.”12 Speciªcally, by em-
ploying a blacklisting strategy as well as threats of coordinated sanc-
tions against nations engaging in harmful tax practices, the OECD has 
sought to coerce many offshore tax havens to incorporate its tax-policy 
recommendations, which are intended to curtail the use of overly 
competitive tax and ªnancial secrecy laws.13
 This Book Review critiques the OECD’s measures to curb harmful 
tax competition by expanding upon two key conclusions reached by 
Brittain-Catlin. First, he opines that such internationally-coordinated 
and afªrmative actions to mitigate the harms caused by tax havens seri-
ously threaten to dismantle their host-country economies given these 
nations’ dependence on the competitiveness of their ªnancial centers 
for economic survival.14 Second, he argues that multilateral policy ef-
                                                                                                                      
on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis in accordance with international obligations. See 
Emerging Global Issue, supra note 3, at 2. Currently, its membership consists of Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., The 
OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Practices: The 2001 Progress Report 2 (2001), avail-
able at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/28/2664438.pdf [hereinafter Progress Report]. 
It is a common declaration that “[t]he OECD is a group of the most industrialized and eco-
nomically powerful nations in the world.” Townsend, Jr., supra note 3, at 252. This claim is 
supported by the fact that 19 of the 25 nations boasting the highest world Gross National 
Products (GNP) in 2003 were OECD members. See Students of the World, Countries of the 
World: Gross National Product (GNP) Distribution—2003, http://www.studentsoftheworld. 
info/infopays/rank/PNB2.html (last modiªed Sept. 25, 2004) [hereinafter GNP List]. Not 
surprisingly, the OECD has been viewed as a “rich nation’s club arrogantly rewriting the rules 
of international competition to protect the interest of politicians from high tax nations.” 
Daniel J. Mitchell, OECD Wants Tax Havens To Tell All, Wall St. J. Eur., Jan. 22, 2001, at 10. 
12 See generally Emerging Global Issue, supra note 3 (providing a discussion of harm-
ful tax practices and a series of recommendations member and non-member nations 
should adopt to minimize the effects of harmful tax competition). The term “harmful tax 
competition” refers to attempts by tax haven regimes to offer no or low effective taxation 
and other beneªts for the sole purpose of attracting tax bases from other countries. Hugh 
J. Ault, Tax Competition: What (If Anything) to Do About It?, in International and Compara-
tive Taxation: Essays in Honour of Klaus Vogel 1, 3 (2002). 
13 See James, supra note 1, at 18–19; Dowling, supra note 1, at 278; Townsend, Jr., supra 
note 3, at 215. 
14 See Brittain-Catlin, supra note 2, at 199–225 (detailing several multilateral efforts 
against tax havens and their speciªc effect on the Cayman economy). Due to this high de-
pendency on foreign capital, any efforts to punish these tax havens or eliminate the ªnancial 
advantages they offer “would have a severe impact on government expenditures and long-
term growth.” Akiko Hishikawa, Note, The Death of Tax Havens?, 25 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. 
Rev. 389, 402 (2002). Similarly, Caribbean and Paciªc tax havens believe that the OECD’s 
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forts to minimize the harms of these offshore tax havens, such as the 
OECD’s campaign against harmful tax competition, cannot succeed 
unless a cohesive interest exists among member nations on the mat-
ter.15
 Using these two themes, this Book Review will illustrate the severity 
of the economic damage and future ªscal threat posed to the offshore 
tax havens as a result of the OECD’s efforts against harmful tax compe-
tition. Furthermore, it will demonstrate how a lack of common interest 
in tax policy among members as well as the lack of support for the 
OECD’s campaign from key nations places the effectiveness of the 
OECD’s measures in doubt. Part I will provide a brief overview of the 
OECD’s afªrmative actions taken to combat the practice of harmful tax 
competition. Part II will detail the economic threats and current 
ªnancial devastation experienced by numerous offshore tax havens as a 
direct result of the OECD’s actions. In doing so, this Book Review will 
ªrst discuss these tax havens’ status as developing nations and their re-
sulting reliance on the continued competitiveness of their ªnancial 
centers for economic survival. Part III will illustrate why the OECD’s 
efforts will be ineffective in combating future harmful tax competition 
due to a lack of converging interests and support among member na-
tions. In concluding, Part IV will suggest that a multilateral campaign 
against money laundering would be far more effective and appropriate 
given the minimal threat such measures pose to these fragile tax haven 
economies as well as the clear common interest in addressing global 
terrorism following numerous high-proªle terrorist attacks. 
I. The OECD’s Efforts to Minimize Harmful Tax Competition 
 Since its inception in 1961, the OECD has served as an advocate, 
forum, and advisor to improve the economies of its member coun-
                                                                                                                      
campaign will inºict irreversible damage to their developing economies because “the crack-
down on tax havens will hinder their efforts to develop new businesses.” See Gillian Gunn 
Clissold, Can the Windward Islands Survive Globalization? 20 (Geo. Univ. Caribbean Project, 
Caribbean Brieªng Paper Series No. 4, Mar. 2001) available at http://www.trinity.edu/aca 
demics/depts/interdisc/international/caribbean%20brieªngs/windward%20islands.pdf last 
visited Mar. 8, 2006) (quoting Trinidadian scholar, Anthony T. Bryan). Some even believe the 
pressure put on these territories by the OECD could return them to “a primitive and back-
wards agrarian lifestyle.” See Everson W. Hull, Professor of Econ., Howard Univ., Remarks 
Presented to Legislators and Staff at the Capitol Hill Club, The OECD Imperialists: Implica-
tions for the Island of Nevis (Sept. 29, 2000), http://www.bahamasb2b.com/b2b/big_picture/ 
articles/dr_hull.htm. 
15 Brittain-Catlin, supra note 2, at 202 (“[T]he multilateral hope of a clear-cut legal 
solution is only sustainable if it is judged to work in the interests of all states concerned.”). 
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tries, increase global market efªciency, and to facilitate expansion of 
trade between both industrialized and developing nations.16 In pur-
suit of these goals, it has sought to promote internationally favorable 
legislation among member and non-member nations so as to reach a 
“uniªed global economic system.”17 One of its most recent pursuits 
began in 1996, when the OECD was prompted by the notable decrease 
in domestic tax revenues among its member nations to address the 
rising issue of harmful tax competition.18 Since then, the OECD has 
produced various guidelines and aggressive strategies intended to 
identify and initiate a uniªed, multilateral offensive against nations 
engaging in harmful tax practices.19
 In 1998, the OECD began its campaign by issuing a report listing 
those competitive tax practices it deemed strong indicators of harmful 
tax competition.20 Doing so created a standard that allowed the OECD 
to later reveal those nations considered to be tax havens.21 Speciªcally, 
the 1998 report held that by imposing no or low effective tax rates, 
maintaining laws that hinder or prohibit the effective exchange of 
ªnancial information with other jurisdictions, not requiring investors to 
engage in substantial investment or transactional activities, and not 
demonstrating legislative, administrative, or legal transparency concern-
ing issues of foreign investment, a nation would be considered a harm-
fully competitive tax haven.22 The 1998 report also promulgated a list of 
                                                                                                                      
16 Townsend, Jr., supra note 3, at 227–28. The Organisation for European Economic 
Cooperation (OEEC) was established under the Marshall Plan to aid in post World War II 
reconstruction. Id. at 227 n.73. The OEEC was renamed the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1961 after granting membership to the United 
States and Canada. Id. 
17 Id. at 228. 
18 See Brittain-Catlin, supra note 2, at 171–72; Emerging Global Issue, supra note 
3, at 7. The OECD speciªcally states that “[g]overnments cannot stand back while their tax 
bases are eroded through the actions of countries which offer taxpayers ways to exploit tax 
havens and preferential regimes to reduce the tax that would otherwise be payable to 
them.” Id. at 37. 
19 See Emerging Global Issue, supra note 3, at 21–35 (detailing the harmful tax prac-
tices generally employed by tax havens). See generally Org. for Econ. Co-operation & 
Dev., Towards Global Tax Co-operation: Progress in Identifying and Eliminating 
Harmful Tax Practices (2000) (listing tax haven nations and speciªc defensive meas-
ures countries should take to protect themselves against harmful tax competition) [here-
inafter Towards Global Tax Co-operation]. 
20 See Emerging Global Issue, supra note 3, at 23. 
21 See id. at 22. Tax havens have also been referred to as “harmful tax regimes,” which 
have been deªned as “preferential, low tax regimes that are primarily tailored to tap into 
the tax bases of other countries.” Hoffman, supra note 5, at 511. 
22 Emerging Global Issue, supra note 3, at 22–25. A nation is non-transparent when it 
demonstrates an unclear application of laws and administrative rulings that may lead to 
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policy recommendations to assist offending nations in reforming their 
practices along with a list of defensive measures that countries could 
take to protect themselves from the effects of harmful tax competi-
tion.23 Lastly, the OECD avowed to produce a list of regimes they be-
lieved to be tax havens according to the factors provided in the report, 
unless those nations agreed to comply with the 1998 report’s guidelines 
in advance.24
 The OECD produced that list in its 2000 report entitled Toward 
Global Tax Co-operation, and it identiªed thirty-ªve jurisdictions, the 
vast majority of which were small island nations, as tax havens.25 The 
OECD’s purpose in producing the list was to stigmatize those nations 
practicing harmful tax competition in an attempt to discourage inves-
tors from engaging in further transactions in these now notorious 
ªnancial centers.26 Any country listed as a tax haven would have to 
                                                                                                                      
inequitable treatment of similarly situated taxpayers. Id. at 28. The lack of a requirement 
for investors to engage in signiªcant ªnancial activity suggests that a jurisdiction is attract-
ing investments and transactions that are purely tax-driven. Id. at 23. 
23 Id. at 40–52. Reformative policy recommendations for offending nations included 
the adoption of Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) rules that ensure certain CFC 
income is attributed to and taxed in the hands of its resident shareholder, the implementa-
tion of legislation that allowed the reporting of international transactions of foreign op-
erations of foreign taxpayers, and the elimination of double taxation for foreign source 
income so as to disqualify income beneªted by harmful tax practices from an exemption. 
See id. at 40–44. The OECD’s suggested defensive measures include adopting more aggres-
sive legislation requiring the exchange of ªnancial information from tax havens as well as 
the restriction of treaty beneªts for entities and income derived from harmful tax regimes. 
See id. at 46–48. 
24 See id. at 71; Kimberly Carlson, When Cows Have Wings: An Analysis of the OECD’s Tax 
Haven Work as It Relates to Globalization, Sovereignty and Privacy, 35 J. Marshall L. Rev. 163, 
178 (2002). 
25 See Towards Global Tax Co-operation, supra note 19, at 17. The OECD’s 2000 re-
port listed the following jurisdictions as meeting tax haven criteria as previously outlined in 
its 1998 Report: Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, the Bahamas, Bahrain, 
Barbados, Belize, the British Virgin Islands, the Cook Islands, Dominica, Gibraltar, Grenada, 
Guernsey/Sark/Alderney, the Isle of Man, Jersey, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Maldives, the Mar-
shall Islands, Monaco, Montserrat, Nauru, the Netherlands Antilles, Niue, Panama, Samoa, 
Seychelles, St. Lucia, St. Christopher & Nevis, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Tonga, Turks & 
Caicos, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Vanuatu. Id. Absent from the list are Bermuda, the Cay-
man Islands, Cyprus, Malta, Mauritius, and San Marino. See id.; Progress Report, supra note 
11, at 8. Though these nations met the OECD’s tax haven criteria, they made an advance 
commitment to adhere to the policy recommendations to avoid being named on the list. See 
id.; Towards Global Tax Co-operation, supra note 19, at 16–17. 
26 See Michael J. Graetz, Foundations of International Income Taxation 501 
(2003) (implying that the threat of being named on the OECD list was the loss of current 
banks and investors); James, supra note 1, at 33 (“[T]he OECD stated its belief that the 
blacklisting would have an adverse impact on the economies of jurisdictions thus listed, 
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commit to either implement the OECD’s 1998 recommendations or 
create an acceptable plan to revise their tax laws to be executed by the 
end of 2005.27 In addition, the 2000 report provided a list of sanctions 
and defensive policy measures that it encouraged all countries affected 
by harmful tax competition to use in order to minimize the detrimen-
tal effects caused by offending tax haven nations.28 All affected na-
tions were to adopt the OECD’s recommended measures in order to 
pressure tax havens into allowing the free exchange of ªnancial in-
formation with foreign tax authorities seeking to subject their resi-
dents to domestic taxes.29 Furthermore, it is argued that the OECD 
intended the defenses and sanctions as a means to coerce tax haven 
nations to raise their effective tax rates to harmonize with the much 
higher ones of the OECD member nations. 30
 The OECD’s afªrmative actions taken to combat harmful tax com-
petition have left offshore tax havens in a serious dilemma.31 Either 
they can comply with the recommendations and relinquish the com-
petitive advantages of their ªnancial industries or they can choose to 
remain uncooperative and face multilateral sanctions.32 Regardless of 
their decision, they are certain to face serious risks of economic back-
lash.33
                                                                                                                      
essentially because some reputable companies, unwilling to do business in jurisdictions 
burdened with negative overtones, would relocate their activities to other jurisdictions.”). 
27 See Towards Global Tax Co-operation, supra note 19, at 19 (“The commitment 
necessary to avoid inclusion on the list of Uncooperative Tax Havens is a public political 
commitment by a jurisdiction to adopt a schedule of progressive changes to eliminate its 
harmful tax practices by 31 December 2005.”). 
28 See id. at 25. The OECD proffered eleven recommended sanctions and defensive 
measures to be taken against harmful tax regimes by affected nations. Id. Included among 
these tactics are: 1) denying preferential tax treatment for business transactions with un-
cooperative tax havens or for transactions seeking to take advantage of the harmful tax 
practices of the uncooperative tax havens, 2) implementing comprehensive laws that re-
quire the open exchange of ªnancial information from transactions involving uncoopera-
tive tax havens to be backed by substantial penalties for noncompliance, 3) withholding 
taxes on payments to residents of uncooperative tax havens, and 4)refusing to enter into 
any tax agreements with uncooperative tax havens as well as the immediate termination of 
any existing tax conventions with such tax havens. Id. 
29 See id. at 24–25. 
30 See Carlson, supra note 24, at 176. Carlson argues that the imposition of low or no 
taxes is a primary factor in determining whether a nation engages in harmful practices. See 
id. Thus, by advocating defensive measures against tax havens, the OECD is effectively 
deeming their low tax rates inappropriate. See id. 
31 See id. at 179–80. 
32 See id.; see also Brittain-Catlin, supra note 2, at 196 (describing how the Cayman Is-
lands had to quickly adopt policy in adherence to multilateral recommendations or face 
sanctions for non-compliance). 
33 See Carlson, supra note 24, at 180; James, supra note 1, at 33. 
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II. Effect of the OECD’s Measures on Offshore  
Tax Haven Economies 
 It is clear from its 2000 list that OECD efforts to minimize harmful 
tax competition have focused on small offshore tax haven nations.34 Yet 
it is the fact that many of these haven nations generally maintain vul-
nerable and developing economies that raises questions as to the ap-
propriateness of the OECD’s campaign.35 The reality is that many of 
these tax haven nations were former European colonies with unstable 
economies that were rooted in agriculture or other basic industries.36 
Unfortunately, not much has changed with the passage of time as these 
islands continue to rely heavily upon single-crop agricultural trade and 
tourism for ªscal preservation.37 As a result, these nations have gener-
ally been unable to catalyze strong, self-sufªcient economies due to the 
high costs of distant trading, volatility of regional climate, a changing 
global trade market, and frequent complications due to political cor-
ruption that signiªcantly affect the agriculture and tourism industries.38 
                                                                                                                      
34 See Towards Global Tax Co-operation, supra note 19, at 17; GNP List, supra note 
11. Many territories recognized as offshore tax havens are considered “small Caribbean and 
Paciªc island nations” as they generally have populations of fewer than 200,000. See Barker, 
supra note 1, at 177; James, supra note 1, at 4. An example of the size differential between the 
OECD countries and these island tax havens is that seven of the blacklisted islands in the 
Paciªc have a combined GDP of $1 billion while Australia, an OECD member country, alone 
has a GDP of $300 billion. Robert Keith-Reid, Tax Haven Clampdown!, Pac. Mag., July 2001, 
http://www.paciªcislands.cc/pm72001/pmdefault.php?urlarticleid=0019 (last visited Feb. 
25, 2006). Also, the total combined population of those seven tax havens is just one-eighth 
that of Sydney. Id. 
35 See Towards Global Tax Co-operation, supra note 19, at 17; GNP List, supra note 
11. Of the thirty-ªve jurisdictions listed by the 2000 OECD report, Panama had the highest 
GNP in 2003, yet was ranked 84th in the world. See Towards Global Tax Co-operation, 
supra note 19, at 180; GNP List, supra note 11. More compelling is that eleven of the coun-
tries reporting the lowest twenty-ªve world GNPs are listed on the OECD’s 2000 report as 
harmful tax havens. See Towards Global Tax Co-operation, supra note 19, at 180; GNP 
List, supra note 11. 
36 See James, supra note 1, at 8–9 (discussing how the economies of nations of the cur-
rent Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM), which include the OECD-
recognized tax havens of Antigua, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, Montserrat, and 
the Bahamas, among others, were historically dependent upon the production of sugar, 
coffee, bananas, and citrus); see also Brittain-Catlin, supra note 2, at 17 (explaining that 
in the 1930s, roughly half of the Cayman Islands’ manpower was working in the shipping 
industry). 
37 Hull, supra note 14 (“For most of these countries, tourism remains the mainstay of 
their economies.”); Clissold, supra note 14, at 2 (noting how Dominica, Grenada, Saint 
Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines “have historically been dependent upon a 
succession of single crops”). 
38 See Clissold, supra note 14, at 2 (illustrating how shifts in world trade rendered sev-
eral Caribbean nations’ single crop reliance in bananas uncompetitive); Dowling, supra 
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Consequently, these island havens have continued to experience pov-
erty, high levels of national debt, and stagnant ªscal growth, which has 
restrained them from becoming ªnancially independent and competi-
tive in the high-tech global economy.39
 These nations’ innovative establishment of competitive offshore 
ªnancial centers, however, has alleviated many of these ªnancial ills 
and moved them toward ªnancial independence.40 Following the im-
plementation of strict ªnancial secrecy laws and levying low or no 
taxes on foreign investors, more than $200 billion dollars of foreign 
direct investment had entered the Caribbean and South Paciªc tax 
haven nations by 1994, a ªgure ten times greater than that reported in 
1985.41 Other reports suggest that the amount of foreign capital held 
                                                                                                                      
note 1, at 267–68 (noting that poor growing seasons, distant location, high government 
costs, reliance on external trade, high probability of natural disasters, and limited re-
sources were factors attributed to their dependence on agriculture that once led to unsta-
ble economies in these offshore tax haven nations); ABC Radio Austl., Paciªc Island Econo-
mies - Can They Make a Go of It? (2005), http://www.abc.net.au/ra/paciªc/places/jemi-
mia.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2006) (“Huge distances, poor and expensive transport and 
lack of business culture all conspire against economic miracles. In some countries, coups, 
crime and corruption have sapped their nation’s economic vitality.”) [hereinafter Paciªc 
Island Economies]. 
39 See Anoop Singh, Dir., W. Hemisphere Dep’t Int’l Monetary Fund, Address at the 
Seminar on Developmental Challenges Facing the Caribbean, The Caribbean Economies: 
Adjusting to the Global Economy, ( June 11, 2004), http://www.imf.org/external/np/ 
speeches/2004/061104a.htm; Paciªc Island Economies, supra note 38. Because of the re-
gion’s low wages for full-time workers, some opine that the resulting poverty within paciªc 
island nations will make it difªcult to sufªciently educate their children to become a force 
in the information age. Id. Continued poverty and unemployment is expected within the 
Caribbean given that the per capita GDP of the region has increased by less than two per-
cent annually in the past twenty-ªve years, a growth rate lower than the average of other 
developing countries. Singh, supra. Furthermore, attempts to increase growth through 
international borrowing have made Caribbean nations “among the most indebted emerg-
ing market countries.” Id. 
40 See Hull, supra note 14 (stating that the offshore banking centers stabilized the econ-
omy of Nevis and minimized the ªscal damage that Hurricane Lenny caused to the once 
highly vulnerable economy); Keith-Reid, supra note 34 (noting how the existence of tax 
haven regimes in the Paciªc islands has become a necessary source of jobs, revenue and 
investment they would not normally have). Hull contends that “the off-shore banking sec-
tor helps to generate a measure of self-sufªciency as the country puts the necessary mecha-
nisms in place to declare is full political and economic freedom . . . .” Hull, supra note 14. 
41 See, e.g., Emerging Global Issue, supra note 3, at 17; James, supra note 1, at 10; 
Townsend, Jr., supra note 3, at 234. “Offshore ªnancial centers attract a wealth of business 
because they have strict conªdentiality rules that appeal to individuals and companies who 
wish to reduce their tax liability and withhold information from competitors, suppliers, 
creditors and customers for legitimate reasons.” Dowling, supra note 1, at 268. Brittain-
Catlin gives an example of such advantages when he notes that in the Cayman Islands, 
“there has never been income tax, corporation tax, capital gains tax, sales tax, inheritance 
tax, or death duties.” Brittain-Catlin, supra note 2, at 14. He further describes the pas-
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in these island nations is actually around $8 trillion.42 More recent 
statistics indicate that the Cayman Islands alone hold over $670 billion 
in banking assets from investors around the globe.43
 Because of the vast sums of capital entering their shores, the 
economies of these tax haven nations have become dependent upon 
the competitiveness of their ªnancial centers to sustain wealth within 
the private sector, create work opportunities essential to decrease na-
tional unemployment rates, and provide sufªcient government reve-
nues to ªnance public health and education expenditures.44 For ex-
ample, the ªnancial centers in the small island of Vanuatu provide 
between $3 million and $4 million to the nation’s government and 
10% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), while also creating four 
hundred jobs in the nation’s banking industry.45 Similarly, it is esti-
mated that 8% to 10% of the GDP of the offshore tax havens in the 
Paciªc are derived from their competitive ªnancial centers, while the 
Caribbean island of Nevis alone derives more than 30% of its tax 
revenues from its offshore ªnancial industry.46 In addition, from 1992 
to 1997, the money generated in the Bahamas due to its activities as a 
tax haven accounted for 15% of its national income and 20% of its 
government revenues; while ªnancial centers in Barbados reaped 5% 
of national income and 22% of government proceeds.47 Public de-
pendence is so elevated that, currently, the government of Barbados 
derives as much as one third of its revenue through its competitive 
                                                                                                                      
sage of the Conªdential Relationships (Preservation) Law that made it “a crime to reveal 
the details of any ªnancial or banking arrangement made on Cayman.” Id. at 34. Similar 
advantages are offered by other offshore nations. See id. at 150–51 (discussing how the 
Bahamas company laws offered “total ªnancial and personal secrecy to shareholders, with 
no requirement to publish ªnancial accounts”); Hoffman, supra note 5, at 514 (illustrating 
that Bermuda does not tax foreign investors on proªts, dividends, or income whether cor-
porate or personal); Offshore Services, Inc., Dominica IBC, http://dominica-taxhaven. 
com (last visited Mar. 8, 2006) (boasting that Dominica provides investors “company in-
corporation, offshore accounts, online banking and asset protection in total secrecy”). 
42 Barker, supra note 1, at 177. 
43 Hoffman, supra note 5, at 513–14. 
44 See Clissold, supra note 14, at 20; Hoffman, supra note 5, at 513; cf. Sir Ronald Mi-
chael Sanders, Remarks by the Chief Foreign Affairs Representative with Ministerial Rank 
of Antigua and Barbuda, The OECD’s ‘Harmful Tax Competition’ Scheme: The Implica-
tions for Antigua and Barbuda (Mar. 27, 2001), http://www.antigua-barbuda.com/busi- 
ness_politics/harmful_tax_competition.asp (last visited Feb. 25, 2006). 
45 Keith-Reid, supra note 34. 
46 Hishikawa, supra note 14, at 402; Hull, supra note 14. 
47 Hishikawa, supra note 14, at 405. 
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ªnancial institutions.48 It is even reported that 80% of the Isle of Jer-
sey’s income is generated through its ªnancial services industry.49
 Given this signiªcant ªscal dependence, any loss of competitive-
ness in the ªnancial services sector resulting from the OECD’s actions 
would have catastrophic results.50 It is reported that these developing 
nations could realize as much as a 25% decrease in GDP should they 
alter their current tax practices to adhere to OECD guidelines.51 Such 
striking losses would lead to an economic collapse devastating enough 
to return these offshore tax havens to their total dependence on highly 
unstable industries.52 Consequently, all recent attempts to achieve the 
economic development, stability, and independence sufªcient to con-
trol poverty and other social ailments experienced by these nations 
would be throttled.53
 Unfortunately, since the advent of the OECD’s report on harmful 
tax competition in 1998, these developing nations have already begun 
to experience devastating losses to their ªnancial sectors.54 For exam-
ple, by adopting legislation to comport with OECD guidelines, Antigua 
and Barbuda lost ªfty-four of the nation’s seventy-two banks while the 
number of businesses incorporated in the territory dropped from 
12,378 to 10,797.55 Such losses resulted in a notable decrease in the 
employment rate and GDP on the twin-island nation.56 It is also re-
ported that the nation of St. Vincent and the Grenadines experienced 
an unemployment rate of 25% to 40% due to the closure of various 
banks and insurance companies on its islands.57 Similarly, the pressure 
from the OECD has forced the Commonwealth of Dominica to shut 
down one of its banks, while several other banks have ºed the island on 
their own volition to sever association with the nation blacklisted as en-
                                                                                                                      
48 James, supra note 1, at 33–34; Hoffman, supra note 5, at 513. 
49 See Barker, supra note 1, at 177. 
50 See Hull, supra note 14; Hoffman, supra note 5, at 513. 
51 Hull, supra note 14; Hoffman, supra note 5, at 513. 
52 Hull, supra note 14 (“If . . . the OECD is successful in bullying its way, the economies 
of low-tax countries . . . will be crippled and sent into a tailspin. We will have been re-
turned to a primitive and backwards agrarian lifestyle.”). 
53 See James, supra note 1, at 34 (noting how the collapse of the ªnancial sector in Bar-
bados would lead to serious ªscal consequences as well as corruption and crime); cf. Clis-
sold, supra note 14, at 20 (discussing the advancements to health, education, and infra-
structure in Caribbean nations that have come as a direct result of their thriving ªnancial 
services sectors). 
54 See James, supra note 1, at 38. 
55 See id. at 34. 
56 Id. at 35. 
57 Id. at 38. 
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gaging in harmful tax competition.58 Because of the lost revenue, Do-
minica was forced to alter its national budget to include increased do-
mestic taxes on fuel, sales, cable, and telecommunications services as 
well as cuts in the size of its government’s cabinet.59
 Even nations that avoided being named on the OECD’s 2000 re-
port by granting an advanced commitment to comply with OECD rec-
ommendations have experienced similar economic droughts because 
they have agreed to open ªnancial information exchange and alter 
taxation policies.60 For example, since acquiescing to OECD demands, 
the Cayman Islands have closed several banks, threatened to revoke 
the charters of companies incorporated within their jurisdiction that 
had not demonstrated signiªcant domestic transactional activities, and 
forced its ªnancial services industry not to guarantee absolute 
ªnancial secrecy to clients.61 By initiating similar reforms in adher-
ence to the OECD’s principles, many offshore havens stand to harm 
their domestic economies, which have relied on the competitive ad-
vantages of their offshore ªnancial industries for economic survival.62
 Though the above observations demonstrate the seriously detri-
mental effects the OECD’s tactics have had on offshore tax havens’ al-
ready vulnerable economies, these effects could worsen as the OECD 
continues to apply pressure on these nations to conform to its tax policy 
recommendations.63 The irony, however, is that the elimination of the 
competitiveness of offshore ªnancial centers and consequent detriment 
to these developing island nations is not likely to result in the OECD’s 
elimination of harmful tax competition.64 In fact, it may be within the 
OECD itself where the biggest hindrance to the effectiveness of its 
campaign lies. 
                                                                                                                      
58 See id. at 37. 
59 Id. 
60 See Brittain-Catlin, supra note 2, at 217. 
61 See id. 
62 See James, supra note 1, 38; Dowling, supra note 1, at 270; Hishikawa, supra note 14, 
at 402. 
63 See Hishikawa, supra note 14, at 417 (asserting that because of the threat of impend-
ing sanctions and the agreement of offshore tax havens to comply with the OECD’s rec-
ommendations, “the death of tax havens seems to be inevitable”). 
64 See Wolfgang Schön, Tax Competition in Europe—General Report, in Tax Competition 
in Europe 1, 16, 17 (Wolfgang Schön ed., 2003) (noting how high-tax OECD countries 
have taken steps, such as lowering taxes, to compete in the European tax setting). 
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III. The Persistence of Harmful Tax Competition  
Despite the OECD’s Initiative 
 While the OECD’s actions work to dismantle offshore tax haven 
economies, they are unlikely to discontinue harmful tax competition 
in the future for two major reasons. First, tax policies and preferences 
among the OECD member countries have proven to be so widely di-
vergent that harmful tax competition does and will continue to exist 
between the member nations even if the OECD’s efforts to eliminate 
the effects of offshore tax havens succeed.65 Second, key members 
have refused their support for the OECD’s efforts, which has severely 
diluted the possibility of maintaining the forceful multilateral cam-
paign needed to deter harmful tax practices.66 Because of these ab-
stentions and the overall lack of common ground on the issue, the 
OECD’s aggressive efforts will prove ineffective in countering harmful 
tax competition in the future. 
A. The Divergent Interests Among OECD Members Concerning Tax Policy 
 Despite the OECD’s call for a uniªed front against harmful tax 
competition, not all of its member countries are in accord with the 
campaign, while others continue to engage in tax practices that have 
the potential to dislocate foreign tax bases.67 This variance of interest in 
the attack against harmful tax competition is manifested in the OECD’s 
2000 report, which acknowledged that a signiªcant number of its 
member countries continued to harbor “preferential tax regimes” that 
continue to harbor potentially harmful tax regimes.68 In fact, though 
                                                                                                                      
65 See id. at 16 (noting how some OECD members have demanded implementation of 
measures to limit tax rate competition in Europe). 
66 See Emerging Global Issue, supra note 3, at 3, 73–78; Hishikawa, supra note 14, at 
412–14. 
67 See Brittain-Catlin, supra note 2, at 220; Kari S. Tikka, National Report Finland, in 
Tax Competition in Europe, supra note 61, at 217, 219. 
68 See Towards Global Tax Co-operation, supra note 19, at 12. The nations men-
tioned include: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States. Id. at 12–14. A “preferential tax re-
gime” differs from a tax haven according to the OECD’s guidelines in that it is a country 
that collects signiªcant revenues from its domestic income tax, but whose tax system has 
features constituting harmful tax competition. See Emerging Global Issue, supra note 3, 
at 20. Furthermore, preferential tax regimes include ªnancial industries such as banking, 
insurance, or mutual funds that may utilize competitive features, but not features, such as 
strict ªnancial secrecy, that the OECD focused on in its 1998 report. See Towards Global 
Tax Co-operation, supra note 19, at 12. Thus, there is not yet a determination as to 
whether the tax practices are actually harmful. Id. 
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the OECD was internally prompted to combat the ills of harmful tax 
competition, it reported that twenty-one out of thirty members still 
maintained ªnancial sectors engaged in potentially harmful tax prac-
tices.69
 Another demonstration of conºicting interests within the OECD 
concerning tax policy is the wide range of corporate tax rates imposed 
by its members.70 Though the average rate of corporate taxation among 
OECD nations was 31.39%, several member countries have drastically 
undercut this level with markedly lower rates.71 For example, Ireland 
recently imposed an effective tax rate of just 7.6% on foreign-sourced 
investments from U.S. multinational corporations.72 Although outside 
pressures compelled Ireland to raise its overall effective corporate tax 
rate to 16% in 2002, it emplaced the competitively low rate of 12.5% by 
2003.73 By boasting a below average corporate tax rate of 18%, Hungary 
also provides unfairly advantageous alternatives to international inves-
tors.74 Yet another OECD country participating in tax competition is 
the United States, a nation which some consider the world’s largest tax 
haven.75 In particular, current U.S. tax laws allow multinational corpo-
rations to decrease or even eliminate taxes the United States may im-
pose on them.76 Also, incorporation laws in some U.S. states provide 
corporate tax advantages similar to the offshore tax havens the OECD 
has blacklisted.77
                                                                                                                      
69 See Towards Global Tax Co-operation, supra note 19, at 12–16 (providing list of 
countries harboring potentially harmful preferential tax regimes); Progress Report, 
supra note 11, at 2 (listing the member nations of the OECD). 
70 See Tikka, supra note 67, at 219. 
71 See id. (noting that European Union (EU) members participate in harmful tax com-
petition). Although the EU is a separate entity from the OECD, eighteen of its twenty-ªve 
members are also members of the thirty-country OECD. See EU, The Member States, 
http://www.eurunion.org/states/ofªces.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2006). 
72 Graetz, supra note 26, at 509. 
73 See id. (indicating that Ireland’s corporate income tax was set at 12.5% in 2003); 
Robert T. Kudrle & Lorraine Eden, The Campaign Against Tax Havens: Will It Last? Will It 
Work?, 9 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 37, 51 (2003) (explaining how the ªscal decentralization of 
the EU allowed for effective campaigns to address Ireland’s discriminatory corporate tax 
rate and Belgium’s attempts to attract foreign corporate headquarters); Tikka, supra note 
67, at 219 (listing Ireland’s 16% corporate tax rate as the lowest amongst other OECD 
members in 2002). 
74 See Tikka, supra note 67, at 219. 
75 See Graetz, supra note 26, at 495. 
76 Karen B. Brown, Harmful Tax Competition: The OECD View, 32 Geo. Wash. J. Int’l L. 
& Econ. 311, 317 (1999). 
77 See Brittain-Catlin, supra note 2, at 79. Speciªcally, Brittain-Catlin notes how Dela-
ware offers corporations numerous advantages including: 
 
366 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 26:351 
 Like the offshore tax havens, these low-tax member countries 
threaten the tax bases of the high taxing welfare states that steered the 
OECD’s efforts against harmful tax competition.78 As a result, many 
prominent welfare state regimes have taken both defensive and offen-
sive measures to minimize the effects of tax competition within the 
OECD itself.79 For example, Denmark was forced to lower its corporate 
tax rates to 30% to compete against its European, OECD peers in gen-
erating optimal domestic tax revenue.80 Similarly, the Netherlands has 
argued that the low corporate tax rates found in some OECD member 
nations pose a threat to its domestic tax base.81 Accordingly, it has de-
manded that the OECD set a minimum corporate tax rate for member 
countries to adopt in order to preserve a ªxed level of tax revenue.82
 Yet another area that evidences a lack of cohesion of interests 
among OECD nations relates to banking secrecy laws, which vary in 
their degree of rigidness of banking privacy afforded clients.83 For in-
stance, Switzerland has been long recognized as providing some of the 
strictest ªnancial secrecy laws in the world.84 This is explained by the 
fact that a breach of ªnancial secrecy is deemed an elevated breach of 
trust under Swiss law, for which a violator is subject to criminal prose-
cution.85 Furthermore, there is no exception to this rule when infor-
                                                                                                                      
inexpensive same-day company incorporation, low fees, minimal ªnancial 
ªling requirements, protection from hostile takeovers, freedom to operate 
companies anonymously, no required public disclosure of accounts, share-
holder secrecy, no sales or inheritance tax, tax advantages for holding com-
panies, and a court system that is seen as having unequaled expertise in com-
plex cases involving multinational companies. 
Id. 
78 See Schön, supra note 64, at 16–18. Many countries within Europe, including Den-
mark, Sweden and Finland, are welfare states that rely on high taxes to maintain their nu-
merous costly public expenditures. See id. at 17–18. Such nations recognize their vulner-
ability to tax competition, and are thus at the forefront of the ªght against tax competition. 
See id. at 17. 
79 See id. at 16–18. 
80 See id. at 17, 219. 
81 See id. at 16. 
82 See id. 
83 See generally International Bank Secrecy (Dennis Campbell ed., 1992) (illustrat-
ing the variance of client protection throughout the world by reviewing international 
banking secrecy laws). 
84 See Lacey & George, supra note 4, at 277 (discussing how Switzerland’s banking se-
crecy laws are famous for providing clients anonymous numbered bank accounts, yet noto-
rious for having aided dictators in hiding corrupt business proceeds). 
85 Hans Bollmann, Switzerland, in International Bank Secrecy, supra note 83, at 661, 
669. Violations of Swiss banking secrecy laws are on par with breaches of silence in ofªcial 
matters such that violators are prosecuted at the initiative of the court, whereas violators of 
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mation is requested by foreign or domestic tax authorities, even in 
cases of tax evasion.86 A similarly strict banking law is found in Lux-
embourg, where even domestic tax authorities are not permitted to 
seek information from banks concerning their clients’ ªnances unless 
very limited exceptions apply.87 Even the United States does not re-
quire its banks and other ªnancial institutions to freely exchange 
ªnancial information of clients with foreign tax agencies.88
 These stringent prohibitions against information exchange are in 
stark contrast to the policies of other members of the OECD, which 
require banks to openly share their clients’ ªnancial data with tax au-
thorities.89 For example, Italian laws have allowed tax agencies to cir-
cumvent banking secrecy at will when conducting tax audits.90 Fur-
thermore, Swedish law requires banks within its jurisdiction to send 
information annually to tax authorities regarding interest paid to resi-
dent clients.91 Few countries are more cooperative with tax agencies 
than Sweden, however, whose laws have granted tax authorities such 
open permission to obtain client information from banks that many 
question whether any protection of information from tax authorities 
exists at all.92 Based on these differences in tax practices among the 
                                                                                                                      
professional secrecy, such as doctors and lawyers, are prosecuted only at the initiative of 
the injured party. Id. 
86 See id. at 678. Exceptions to Switzerland’s strict ªnancial secrecy apply only to cases 
of tax fraud, which entail the “deception of the tax authorities by fraudulent means, espe-
cially by false or falsiªed documents which results in an underpayment of tax.” Id. This 
high level of secrecy undermines the efforts of the OECD, which recommends that bank-
ing laws allow all client information to be shared with any country or tax authority freely 
and openly. See Emerging Global Issue, supra note 3, at 29–30, 46–47. 
87 Guy Harles, Luxembourg, in International Bank Secrecy, supra note 83, at 469, 
473. Tax authorities can intrude to garner information for the purposes of assessing in-
heritance taxes on deceased resident taxpayers. Id. Furthermore, in certain circumstances, 
domestic tax authorities may make inquiries into registration and mortgage duties as well 
as assessments of the value-added tax. Id. Nonetheless, the limited scope of these excep-
tions ensures the overall insulation of banking secrecy from domestic tax authorities in 
Luxembourg. See id. 
88 Hishikawa, supra note 14, at 407. 
89 See Olof Wærn & Monica Petersson, Sweden, in International Bank Secrecy, supra 
note 83, at 647, 651; Cesare Vento & Raffaella Betti Berutto, Italy, in International Bank 
Secrecy, supra note 83, at 385, 389. 
90 Vento & Berutto, supra note 89, at 389. What further separates Italian laws from 
those countries with strict ªnancial secrecy provisions is that there is no need for tax audi-
tors to establish any criminal suspicion to intercept a client’s banking records. See id. 
91 Wærn & Petersson, supra note 89, at 651. Speciªcally, Swedish law requires an an-
nual report to tax authorities of: 1) interest accrued on the client’s accounts, 2) interest 
paid by the client, and 3) the balance and transactions on the account for a given period 
of time. Id. at 651–52. 
92 Id. at 651. 
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OECD members, it is clear that harmful tax competition continues to 
thrive and will continue to do so even if the effects of offshore tax ha-
vens are neutralized.93
B. The Lack of Support by Key Members of the OECD 
 Varying interests in tax policy have not only fostered tax competi-
tion within the OECD, but they have also caused several key members 
to abstain from or withdraw their support for measures to combat 
harmful tax competition.94 When the OECD’s 1998 report was re-
leased, both Switzerland and Luxembourg refused to sign the agree-
ment because of their discord with the organization’s harsh stance 
against banking secrecy.95 Their disapproval of the OECD’s aggressive 
actions has not faltered, as they have continued to withhold their en-
dorsement of the OECD’s subsequent reports.96 Given the historically 
strict banking secrecy laws in these two countries, their noncompli-
ance seriously undermined the OECD’s efforts to have its members 
agree to adopt legislation to open the exchange of ªnancial informa-
tion with foreign tax agencies.97 Yet Switzerland and Luxembourg 
were not alone, as several other member countries withdrew their 
support from the OECD’s campaign as later reports and recommen-
dations were produced.98 For example, both Belgium and Portugal 
rescinded their approval of the OECD’s efforts against harmful tax 
competition following its release of a 2001 update of its goals and pro-
gress.99 Though Belgium and Portugal agreed with some aspects of 
the OECD’s plan, the impetus for their withdrawal was their objection 
to the more onerous demands made upon some member nations to 
implement changes in tax legislation.100
                                                                                                                      
93 See Schön, supra note 64, at 16 (noting how EU nations dispute the fairness of tax 
competition within Europe). 
94 See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 26, at 511; Hishikawa, supra note 14, at 412–13, 414; 
Townsend, Jr., supra note 3, at 235. 
95 See Emerging Global Issue, supra note 3, at 73–78 (providing statements from both 
Luxembourg and Sweden announcing their decision not to approve the OECD’s 1998 
report). 
96 See Hishikawa, supra note 14, at 414. 
97 See Bollmann, supra note 85, at 678; Harles, supra note 87, at 472–73. 
98 See, e.g., Schön, supra note 64, at 12; Hishikawa, supra note 14, at 415 (noting that Bel-
gium, Portugal, and the United States also withdrew their support of the OECD project). 
99 See Schön, supra note 64, at 12. 
100 Hishikawa, supra note 14, at 414. Belgium and Portugal had already recognized the 
practice of ring fencing within their borders and had committed to its elimination. Id. 
Ring fencing was identiªed by the OECD as the practice of by a ªnancial center or regime 
of partially or fully isolating itself from its domestic economy by either excluding resident 
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 Probably the most devastating blow to the OECD’s campaign, 
however, was the defection of the United States in 2001.101 Citing its 
disinterest in global tax harmonization, efforts to coerce foreign na-
tions to adopt speciªc tax policy, and aggressive policies against tax 
evasion, the United States decided that the OECD’s report was overly 
broad and inconsistent with the country’s tax and economic priori-
ties.102 Given the country’s clout as a global economic leader, many 
member nations felt that inclusion of the United States in the OECD’s 
efforts was essential to the OECD’s success, and thus the organization 
was forced to amend its project to ensure U.S. involvement.103 Those 
revisions diluted the overall aggressiveness of the campaign by relax-
ing measures against tax evasion, lifting sanctions on tax havens prac-
ticing ring fencing, and extending the deadlines by which countries 
had to commit to cooperate with the OECD’s initiatives.104
 This lack of support by key member nations has had two major re-
percussions on the OECD’s efforts against harmful tax competition. 
First, such defections have weakened the multilateral leverage of the 
OECD’s efforts, which even the organization itself has admitted is cru-
cial to the overall effectiveness of the project.105 Second, noncompli-
ance by member countries has given offshore tax havens a strong ar-
                                                                                                                      
taxpayers from taking advantages of its tax beneªts or by harboring enterprises that pro-
hibit operation in the domestic market. Emerging Global Issue, supra note 3, at 26–28. 
Such measures “effectively protect[] the sponsoring country from the harmful effects of its 
own incentive regime.” Id. at 26. 
101 See Brittain-Catlin, supra note 2, at 202–03; Hishikawa, supra note 14, at 412–14. 
102 Brittain-Catlin, supra note 2, at 203; Terrence R. Chorvat, A Different Perspective 
on Tax Competition, 35 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 501, 504 (2003); Hishikawa, supra note 14, 
at 412, 413. In describing U.S. reluctance to cooperate with the OECD’s efforts, the Secre-
tary of the Treasury at the time, Paul O’Neil, was quoted as saying, “[w]e have no business 
telling any nation what their tax rates should be.” Brittain-Catlin, supra note 2, at 203. 
He further expressed the country’s unwillingness to participate in any initiative to harmo-
nize world taxes. Hishikawa, supra note 14, at 412. In subsequent talks with the OECD, the 
United States also manifested its opposition to the harsh OECD stance against tax evasion. 
See id. at 413. 
103 See Brittain-Catlin, supra note 2, at 203 (noting the outrage of France’s ªnance 
minister over the lack of U.S. support for the OECD project in his statement, “[t]he largest 
power in the world cannot disengage from the planet’s problems”); Hishikawa, supra note 
14, at 413–14 (noting how the OECD was forced to weaken its stance against harmful tax 
practices through several modiªcations in order to retain U.S. backing of the project); 
GNP List, supra note 11 (showing that the United States had the largest GDP in 2003, a 
ªgure more than double that of the second place nation, Japan). 
104 See Hishikawa, supra note 14, at 413–14. 
105 See Emerging Global Issue, supra note 3, at 38 (“[T]hese multilateral responses 
are essential because . . . co-ordinated action is the most effective way to respond to the 
pressures created in the new world of global capital mobility.”). 
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gument in their opposition of the OECD and its recommendations.106 
Essentially, they have noted the injustice of forcing economically vul-
nerable island nations to conform to the OECD’s recommendations 
when its own members have refused to do so.107 Given these serious 
threats to a uniªed and widely-supported effort against harmful tax 
competition, the future effectiveness of the OECD’s project is in 
doubt.108
 Because its efforts have focused on coercing offshore tax havens 
to open ªnancial disclosures and engage in less competitive tax prac-
tices, the OECD’s campaign against harmful tax competition has 
gravely endangered the ªscal stability of emerging tax haven econo-
mies.109 Doing so without uniªed cooperation or concerted tax policy 
interests among its own members seriously calls into question the ap-
propriateness of the OECD’s campaign against harmful tax competi-
tion. There is, however, another issue concerning offshore tax havens 
where multilateral efforts may be far more effective and economically 
equitable—money laundering.110
IV. Money Laundering: A More Appropriate  
Multilateral Focus 
 Offshore tax havens have long been associated with money laun-
dering because their strict ªnancial secrecy laws allow the creation of 
anonymous accounts while prohibiting the disclosure of ªnancial in-
formation to foreign tax authorities.111 Recent reports indicate that as 
much as $600 billion of illegal money is hidden in offshore banks.112 
Furthermore, there is strong evidence indicating that a substantial por-
tion of these funds concealed offshore has been used to sustain terrorist 
                                                                                                                      
106 See James, supra note 1, at 29; Hishikawa, supra note 14, at 415. 
107 See James, supra note 1, at 29 (discussing how the CARICOM nations complained 
that they were being forced to comply with the OECD, although Switzerland and Luxem-
bourg refused); Hishikawa, supra note 14, at 415 (noting Vanuatu’s outrage concerning 
the OECD’s actions against their ªnancial regimes given that Switzerland, Luxembourg, 
Belgium, and Portugal had refused to adhere to the organization’s recommendations). 
108 See Hishikawa, supra note 14, at 417. 
109 See Carlson, supra note 24, at 180, 181; Hishikawa, supra note 14, at 417. 
110 See Lacey & George, supra note 4, at 274–75. Money laundering is the “process by 
which one conceals the existence, illegal source, or illegal application of income and then 
disguises that income to make it appear legitimate in the open economic market.” Id. at 267. 
111 See id. at 274–75, 277; Dowling, supra note 1, at 271. 
112 Dowling, supra note 1, at 271. 
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groups such as Al-Qaeda.113 Consequently, many countries and interna-
tional groups have implemented measures to curb the prevalence of 
international money laundering, though most efforts have proven inef-
fective.114 Nevertheless, there is an indication that a new wide-scale, 
multilateral effort against money laundering would prove successful, 
ironically because the barriers that the OECD’s campaign against harm-
ful tax competition faces are not present on this particular issue.115 
Speciªcally, anti-money laundering policies are less invasive to ªnancial 
secrecy, thus posing only a nominal economic threat to the fragile off-
shore tax haven economies.116 In addition, due to the ubiquitous na-
ture of money laundering and recent high-proªle terrorist attacks, the 
current global climate indicates a tremendous convergence of global 
interests on the matter.117
A. The Minimal Economic Threat to Offshore Tax Havens 
 There are two major reasons why an immediate multilateral cam-
paign to minimize money laundering may pose less grave threats to off-
shore economies than the OECD’s efforts against harmful tax competi-
                                                                                                                      
113 See Brittain-Catlin, supra note 2, at 207–13 (explaining U.S. concerns that Osama 
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tion. First, the measures needed to uncover criminal funds, such as the 
“Know Your Customer” (KYC) rules, may be less intrusive than those of 
the OECD to report ªnancial information of all foreign investors.118 
Though KYC rules require banks to ascertain information about their 
clients, they do not necessarily compel the disclosure of that informa-
tion to other tax agencies or foreign governments unless there is suspi-
cion of criminal transactions.119 Therefore, by adopting a lenient KYC 
provision rather than the strict ªnancial openness required by the 
OECD, offshore tax havens would only risk the ºight of criminal money 
from their ªnancial centers, while legitimate foreign-sourced income 
would remain protected by banking secrecy laws.120 Given that the 
amount of criminal money held offshore is less signiªcant than some 
have speculated, these KYC rules would allow offshore havens to retain 
the majority of their foreign-sourced income along with the generous 
tax revenues, elevated employment rates, and overall private wealth it 
generates.121 Thus, unlike the wholly intrusive information exchange 
required by the OECD, adopting limited KYC provisions would allow 
tax haven nations the ability to sustain the independent wealth needed 
to counter the debt and poverty that have plagued them as developing 
nations.122
 Second, while adopting the OECD’s recommendations poses seri-
ous economic risks to offshore tax havens, offshore tax havens actually 
stand to gain ªscally by enacting anti-money laundering legislation.123 
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vices industries is crucial for the economic self-sufªciency of Caribbean nations). 
123 Bachus, supra note 117, at 839–40; see Carlson, supra note 24, at 180, 181; Hoffman, 
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Money laundering has not only sustained organized crime in offshore 
havens, but the persistence of criminal activity has discouraged legiti-
mate investors from engaging in offshore transactions.124 Therefore, by 
establishing measures against money laundering, offshore tax havens 
can both increase legal commercial development and ensure the entry 
of legitimate capital into their ªnancial institutions necessary to catalyze 
their economic stability and independence.125 Because of the ªscal in-
centives and the minimal economic risks in espousing modest KYC laws, 
some offshore havens have already evidenced a clear desire to cooper-
ate in the global ªght against money laundering.126 Though their sup-
port is crucial, it is the fact that many nations around the globe also 
share the same interests that will ensure the success of a multilateral 
effort to combat international money laundering.127
B. The Convergence of Global Interests Against Money Laundering 
 Money laundering is truly a global issue because, unlike harmful 
tax competition, it affects the ªnancial institutions of every country.128 
Even the world’s most developed countries, including the United King-
dom and the United States, have contributed to the problem.129 Fur-
thermore, because money laundering is a criminal matter rather than 
one of tax policy preference, there has been universal recognition of its 
impropriety as well as accord in the urgency to address it through 
uniªed policy.130 However, it is because of major recent terrorist attacks 
that international interest have converged to such a point as to ensure 
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the needed cooperation for an effective multilateral campaign against 
money laundering.131
 Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States immediately 
enacted laws to aid in uncovering terrorist funds held in its ªnancial 
centers.132 Soon after, numerous developed nations and offshore tax 
havens were prompted by U.S. initiatives and quickly agreed to adopt 
measures to combat international money laundering and uncover hid-
den terrorist ªnancing.133 Since then, fervor for the search of terrorist 
funds through anti-money laundering legislation has only intensiªed, 
especially following the London bombings on July 21, 2005.134 What is 
important, however, is that this zeal is not centralized within a few na-
tions of similar culture or disposition; rather numerous countries of 
varied background have recently experience the ªrst-hand effects of 
terrorism including Jordan, Spain, the Philippines, and India.135 Be-
cause this internationally convergent interest indicates the elevated po-
tential for effectiveness, now is the opportune time to initiate a uniªed, 
multilateral campaign against money laundering.136
Conclusion 
 The OECD’s campaign against harmful tax competition employs 
economically inappropriate measures that come at an inopportune 
time. By coercing offshore tax havens to comply with its recommenda-
tions through multilateral defense measures and economic sanctions, 
the OECD has diluted the strict banking secrecy laws of these offshore 
nations to allow the open disclosure of ªnancial information with for-
eign governments. This sudden loss of competitiveness has resulted in 
the ªscal collapse of numerous developing offshore nations, most of 
which are highly dependent on the revenues from their ªnancial ser-
vices industries for economic stability and growth. Regrettably, these 
consequences do not signify the end of harmful tax competition, as 
many countries within the OECD itself continue to maintain low cor-
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porate tax rates and strict banking secrecy provisions to attract for-
eign-sourced income from high-tax countries. Furthermore, the fu-
ture effectiveness of the OECD’s efforts is doubtful given that many 
key nations, such as the United States and Switzerland, have with-
drawn or withheld their support for the organization’s aggressive at-
tack against competitive tax practices. 
 Despite the clear limitations of the OECD’s campaign against 
harmful tax competition, a similar multilateral movement to address 
international money laundering would prove more successful and 
ªscally equitable to nations of all economic conditions. The laws nec-
essary to uncover illegal funds, such as moderate KYC laws, prove less 
invasive than those in the campaign against harmful tax competition, 
which require unlimited ªnancial information exchange with tax au-
thorities. Therefore, by adopting the less intrusive KYC rules, offshore 
tax havens risk deterring illegal investments exclusively, while protect-
ing the revenues from legitimate deposits upon which their economic 
sustainability depends. In addition, these offshore ªnancial centers 
actually stand to gain from the suppression of money laundering as it 
would entice a larger volume of legitimate investors, thus stimulating 
the economic growth necessary to remove these offshore tax havens 
from “developing nation” status. Most compelling, however, is that 
such a campaign would prove effective given the common global in-
terest in eradicating the concealment of illegal funds offshore. 
Speciªcally, the ubiquity of offenses and the rising interest in uncover-
ing terrorist ªnances around the world ensures the pervasive support 
needed for an effective and globally-uniªed movement against money 
laundering. 
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